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Explaining the Riddle of America: What Europeans 
Should Know about Madisonian Democracy 
Abstract 
Long a puzzle to both its admirers and detractors across the world, the United States of America has, in the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, become more puzzling than ever. A variety of explanations has been 
proposed for America’s paradoxical combination of apparent “statelessness” and its capability to produce posi-
tive policy outcomes. This essay will argue that, properly understood, the structural features of America’s con-
stitutional scheme of governance, largely credited to founder James Madison, provide a necessary but insuffi-
cient explanation of the “riddle of America”. The success of America’s “compound republic” (in Madison’s 
words), was intended to depend not only on the capacities of its basic governing structures – separation of 
powers, checks and balances, federalism, and pluralism – but, in extremis, on the inherent fairness of “the peo-
ple”, both of which have been achieved in American history but neither of which can be guaranteed. The 
source of authority and, of equal importance, the legitimacy of American governing institutions and their out-
comes is the faith placed in them by citizens, elected officials, and judges, requiring a sense of responsibility 
on the part of all to the principles that protect all. That the sense of responsibility on the part of some, as Amer-
ica’s recent political crises demonstrates, can fail, jeopardizes not only domestic liberty and justice but threat-
ens the well being of peoples far distant.  
 
Key words: James Madison, checks and balances, structures of governance, U.S. Government 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following facts about the United States of America:  
 
● Thirteen colonies defeated Great Britain in a war for independence organized as a 
confederacy of “states” barely capable of unified action. 
● Its founders adopted a republican constitution of “separated powers”, “checks and 
balances”, and federalism; drafted in four months, it has been amended only twenty-
six times in 220 years and is now the oldest constitution in the world continuously in 
force.  
● The “Union” won a divisive war against secessionist states with consequences which 
still echo in American culture and politics.  
● In its second century, the U.S. national government allocated its rapidly increasing 
economic and political capacities toward victories in two world wars begun in 
Europe, the reconstruction of former enemies and allies, and the creation of new alli-
ances warranting the twentieth-century sobriquet “the American Century”. 
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● Along the way, American government has abolished slavery, established universal 
suffrage and public education, made significant reductions in poverty and income 
inequality, and codified a dramatic expansion of civil rights. 
 
Yet, beginning in 2008, America’s regulatory policies and financial institutions led the world 
into a deep, prolonged financial and economic crisis from which full recovery remains in 
doubt. Then, in 2011, less than two years after the enactment of a historic reform of its health 
care system, an ideological faction of Congressional Republicans was able, in effect, to veto 
pragmatic long-term solutions to the crisis crafted by leaders of both parties and favored by a 
majority of Americans, yielding only when an expedient that postponed solving the underly-
ing problems was the only feasible action. Defaulting on its financial obligations to its credi-
tors was averted only on the brink of chaos, producing a first ever downgrade of its credit rat-
ing. A nation whose “manifest destiny” on the North American continent was fulfilled by 
immigrants was subjecting them to harassment and persecution. Its foreign and national secu-
rity policies, on which the free world once depended, had become uncertain and confusing. 
Only one fourth of American citizens trusted their national government to “do the right thing” 
all or most of the time, and eighty percent disapproved of Congress.  
Long a puzzle to both its admirers and detractors across the world, the United States 
of America has, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, become more puzzling 
than ever at home and abroad. How are we to account for what Eric Foner termed “the 
riddle of America” (Foner 1984, 57).  
Over a long period, students of American political development and American excep-
tionalism have adduced an evolving variety of explanations for America’s paradoxical 
combination of apparent “statelessness” and its capability to produce positive policy out-
comes. Explanations range from the inherent weakness of its institutions to its distinctive 
anti-statist ideology to “the state of society” (King/Lieberman 2008; cf. Schuck/Wilson 
2008). Desmond King and Robert Lieberman have added to the list of possible explana-
tions still unresolved issues associated with race and the tendency of American’s regula-
tory style of government to promote “comparatively distinctive state-society associational 
patterns” (2008, 378). 
Many in America believe that, whatever might have been its virtues in the past, the 
American political system is now broken. The debt crisis of 2011 “revealed a number of 
weaknesses in the political system,” said conservative Washington Post columnist Mi-
chael Gerson, whose views were widely shared (Gerson 2011). The presidency was 
weakened when one party took “a routine procedure – the debt-limit increase – and 
[turned] it into a powerful policy lever.” That party had come to be dominated by an in-
transigent faction that attained a virtual veto over pragmatic solutions to the crisis. The 
resulting policy would hurt the poor and the unemployed the most, make the revival of a 
struggling economy much more difficult, and presage rising debt levels due to higher in-
terest costs on existing Federal debt. Public opinion polls revealed extraordinary anger 
among people who expected better from their leaders. Ideological polarization of the two 
political parties made serious discussion of the most important issues of taxation and enti-
tlements literally impossible. “[A]fter this spectacle,” Gerson asked, “why would a credit 
rating agency, a foreign investor or an American voter have confidence in the ability of 
the American political system to confront” those issues?  
This essay will argue that, properly understood, the structural features of America’s 
constitutional scheme of governance, largely credited to founder James Madison, provide 
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a necessary but insufficient explanation of why America can both supply “the defects of 
better motives”, in Madison’s words,1 while also demonstrating the failings of baser mo-
tives.2 These failings – on near-fatal display as Abraham Lincoln was gaining the presi-
dency on the eve of the Civil War – were on conspicuous display again during America’s 
2011 “debt/spending/deficit crisis”. But most readings of the words of the founders, and 
especially of Madison, have neglect passages that add essential qualifications to their 
most famous statements which emphasize the structures of government. These qualifica-
tions make it clear that the success of America’s “compound republic” (in Madison’s 
words), was intended to depend not only on the capacities of its basic governing struc-
tures but, in extremis, on the inherent fairness of “the people”, both of which have been 
achieved in American history but neither of which can be guaranteed.  
2. “The Political Hand”: Madison’s Institutional Design 
In The Federalist, Nos. 47 and 51, Madison explains the institutional design incorporated 
in the then-draft Constitution. In Federalist 47, he examined “the particular structure of 
this government, and the distribution of . . . power among its constituent parts”, that is, 
among its three “departments”: legislative, executive, and judicial (312).3 His objective 
was mainly to counter the criticism that the powers of the three branches were overlap-
ping, not strictly separate. His argument that none of the colonies, nor the government of 
Great Britain, featured such strict separation, nor did Montesquieu, author of the tripartite 
scheme, required such separation. 
Checks and Balances 
It is in the Federalist No. 51, “The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper 
Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments”, that Madison explains the 
structural key to understanding American democracy (Lynn forthcoming). In that famous 
essay, Madison addresses the question: How shall the separation of powers be maintained 
in practice? His argument is both a passionate defense of liberty and an elegantly rea-
soned argument for the structures in the draft Constitution, his analysis both a splendid 
polemic and a sophisticated example of institutional design. A balance of power will be 
secured by an “interior structure” (336) of checks and balances between the separate de-
partments (branches) of the government. 
Madison’s argument proceeds from the premise that “each department should have a 
will of its own” (336). While that principle might be secured by giving each department 
an entirely independent base of power among the people, practical considerations – en-
suring a qualified judiciary and an executive with sufficient authority and resources to act 
– dictate that “some deviations . . . must be admitted” (336). Argues Madison, “the great 
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, 
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . [A]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition” (337).  
Madison’s combination of separated powers and checks and balances is why Dwight 
Waldo and other seminal scholars of American public administration, many with intellec-
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tual roots in European universities, believed that European administrative thought and 
practice were inappropriate for the emerging American administrative state. It explains, 
too, why Walter Kickert and other Europeans argue that American administrative thought 
and practice are not automatically transferable to European and other non-American con-
texts (Lynn 2008). 
Madison and Adam Smith 
A significant exception to the American aversion to foreign doctrines was Adam Smith. 
The resemblance between Madison’s institutional design and the ideas of Smith concern-
ing the virtues of collective action, in his case markets, guided by a competition of inter-
ests is no accident. Madison and other American Founders were familiar with Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations and shared his liberal values. As a consequence, according to David 
Prindle (2004, 223), “Madison believed that in politics as in commerce, market competi-
tion among self-interested participants, if correctly structured, could produce republican 
virtue.” Prindle continues:  
“Madison is a philosopher of regulated conflict, but he is not an advocate of amoral struggle [as 
some have contended];4 he intends the competition his system creates to force self-interested indi-
viduals to become partisans of public virtue. As with Smith, it turns out that given the right sort of 
social order the evident tendency of men to pursue their own interest is a boon, not a problem” 
(234). 
 
In the light of financial and fiscal crises beginning in 2008, the truth of that proposition 
is, as already noted, far from clear, however. 
Checks and Balances in Practice 
The checks and balances in the Constitution itself are enumerated in Figure 1. They are 
familiar to all students of American government and will not be further explained.  
Madison, also made reference in The Federalist 51 to “subordinate distributions of 
power” (337):  
“This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be 
traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly 
displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and ar-
range the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the pri-
vate interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights” (337). 
 
Although not often interpreted as such (or at all), the concept of subordinate distributions 
of power can be construed as depicting a system of what may be termed “subordinate 
checks and balances” created pursuant to the exercise of constitutional authority and re-
sulting in what has been called “the diffusion of sovereignty” (Price 1965).5 These sub-
ordinate checks and balances are defined, for example in statutes or other rules that have 
the force of law as well as in conventions of governance, such as the standing rules of the 
Senate and the House and the nominating practices of political parties (Hill/Lynn 2009).  
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Figure 1: Checks and Balances in U.S. Constitution 
Legislative Branch 
 
 ● Checks on the Executive  
 ● Impeachment power (House) 
● Trial of impeachments (Senate) 
● Selection of the President (House) and Vice 
President (Senate) in the case of no majority 
of electoral votes 
 ● May override Presidential vetoes 
 ● Senate approves departmental appointments 
 ● Senate approves treaties and ambassadors 
 ● Approval of replacement Vice President 
 ● Power to declare war 
● Power to enact taxes and allocate funds 
● President must, from time-to-time, deliver a 
State of the Union address 
 
 ● Checks on the Judiciary  
 ● Senate approves federal judges 
 ● Impeachment power (House) 
 ● Trial of impeachments (Senate) 
● Power to initiate constitutional amendments 
● Power to set courts inferior to the Supreme 
Court 
 ● Power to set jurisdiction of courts 
 ● Power to alter the size of the Supreme Court 
 
● Checks on the Legislature – because it is bi-
cameral, the Legislative branch has a degree of 
self-checking  
● Bills must be passed by both houses of Con-
gress 
● House must originate revenue bills 
● Neither house may adjourn for more than 
three days without the consent of the other 
house 
● All journals are to be published  
 
  Executive Branch 
 
● Checks on the Legislature  
● Veto power 
● Vice President is President of the Senate 
● Commander in chief of the military 
● Recess appointments 
● Emergency calling into session of one or both 
houses of Congress 
● May force adjournment when both houses 
cannot agree on adjournment 
● Compensation cannot be diminished Power to 
set jurisdiction of courts 
 
● Checks on the Judiciary 
 ● Power to appoint judges 
 ● Pardon power 
 
● Checks on the Executive  
● Vice President and Cabinet can vote that the 
President is unable to discharge his duties 
 
 
Judicial Branch 
 
 ● Checks on the Legislature  
 ● Judicial review 
 ● Seats are held on good behavior 
 ● Compensation cannot be diminished 
 
● Checks on the Executive  
 ● Judicial review 
● Chief Justice sits as President of the Senate 
during presidential impeachment 
 
 
Source: “U.S. Constitution on Line” at: http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_cnb.html.  
 
Four categories of subordinate checks and balances encompass a wide swath of what Ma-
dison called “the whole system of human affairs” (examples of which are enumerated in 
Figure 2): checks by one branch on another; checks that operate within the branches of 
government; checks by “the people”, that is by private citizens and organizations, on the 
branches of government; and lawful delegations to or acknowledgements of power and 
influence of private individuals or organized entities (Lynn forthcoming). These sorts of 
checks have a pervasive influence on the character and extent of government’s capacity 
to deliberate, decide upon, and implement how the manifold expression of public interests 
will be determined and fulfilled. 
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Figure 2: Subordinate Checks and Balances 
Between the branches of government 
  
● Legislative authority to compel executive branch officials to testify under oath concerning their actions 
● Judicial authority to issue, and enforce consent decrees and injunctions 
● Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, and state equivalents 
● Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
● Legislative and legislatively-authorized oversight and investigation 
● “Sunset” laws 
  
Within the branches of government 
  
● Inspectors general 
● U.S. Office of the Special Counsel 
● Whistleblower and other public employee protections 
● Separation of legislative authorization and appropriation processes 
● Multi-tiered judiciary 
● Overhead offices (personnel, budget, audit, general counsel) 
● Professional advisory panels, state laboratories 
  
Outside the branches of government 
  
● Administrative Procedure Act 
● Freedom-of-information, government-in-the-sunshine acts; WTO disclosure rules 
● Office of the IRS Taxpayer Advocate, ombudsmen 
● Laws at all levels of government authorizing “citizens petitions” 
● “Watchdog” groups organized under federal and state laws as nonprofit organizations  
  
Other 
  
● National Academy of Sciences/Institute of Medicine 
● Federal False Claims Act 
● The professions (auditors, actuaries, statisticians, intelligence analysts, scientists) and their codes of conduct. 
● Negotiated and private standard-setting and rulemaking (Government Accounting Standards Board, Underwriters 
Laboratories) 
Source: Based on Hill and Lynn (2009) 
 
The first category of subordinate checks and balances adds to the original capabilities of 
each branch to check the others. It includes, for example, such diverse mechanisms as the 
authority of the courts to approve, monitor, and enforce consent decrees in lawsuits in 
which the government is a defendant; the activities of the Government Accountability Of-
fice and the Congressional Budget Office, both of which are agencies of the U.S. Cong-
ress, to provide audits, analyses, research, and evaluations which often contain alternative 
perspectives to those of the executive branch on public policy and management issues 
and, therefore, provide a check on executive or legislative branch rationalizations of is-
sues and events;6 and the authority of legislatures to oversee, monitor, and investigate the 
activities of public officers and agencies and to authorize independent investigations for 
such purposes in which witnesses may be subpoenaed.  
The second category of subordinate checks and balances operates within the branches 
of government. Within the executive branch, for example, it includes inspectors general, 
whose independent investigations influence the content and direction of public policy, 
protections afforded whistleblowers and other employee rights (including the right to sue 
their employers), and overhead offices that perform functions such as review of agency 
budget requests and budget execution, set and administer or implement human resources 
policies, and internal audit of agency accounts. Within the judicial branch, this category 
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includes the multiple levels of review of the decisions of trial courts. Within the legisla-
tive branch, the category includes, for example, the separation of the authorization and 
the appropriations processes and a wide variety of rules that allocate authority and bal-
ance competing interests of legislative committees and subcommittees. 
The third category of subordinate checks and balances concerns the power of private 
citizens and groups with respect to the three branches of government. This category in-
cludes various transparency measures such as labor relations acts, freedom of information 
acts, administrative procedure acts, acts authorizing citizens’ petitions, and “government 
in the sunshine” and open meetings acts (some of which are actually written into the con-
stitutions of individual states), which provide citizens with opportunities to question the 
exercise of government authority, with the attendant political consequences, or even, usu-
ally on an ad hoc basis, to share power over decisions affecting local interests. This cate-
gory also includes watchdog groups which enjoy the privileges of formal non-for-profit 
status, such as tax exemption and the right to receive tax-exempt contributions and en-
gage in virtually constant surveillance of public agency activity and actively engage in 
litigation on behalf of their constituencies. 
The final category of subordinate checks and balances includes the variety of ways by 
which power and influence are distributed among individuals or among entities created or 
allowed to exercise it in the pursuit of a public interest and in lieu of, but often in con-
junction with, government agencies. This category includes, for example, Congressional 
chartering of such entities as the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of 
Medicine, which are often commissioned by the executive branch and Congress to pro-
duce authoritative analyses of controversial public policy issues (such as dietary stan-
dards and the nature and extent of global climate change); the power inherent in the inde-
pendent professional status of public employees such as actuaries, scientists, lawyers, 
physicians, and statisticians, many of which have enforceable codes of ethics; the Federal 
False Claims Act, which entitles employees of private firms under contract to the gov-
ernment who report deliberate waste of public funds to a share of any funds that are re-
covered through legal action; and government’s reliance on what are termed negotiated 
and private rulemaking and on self-regulation (such as that of the Government Account-
ing Standards Board and Underwriters Laboratories). 
Veto Players 
The implications of this complex system of checks and balances is illuminated by a sim-
ple veto player analysis (Tsebelis 2002). A veto player is a political actor with the power 
to prevent an action from being taken or a policy from being adopted. The U.S. Constitu-
tion establishes three institutional veto players in the legislative process: the Senate, the 
House of Representatives, and the President; any one of them can prevent (“veto”) the 
enactment of a law. In the event of a legal challenge to the constitutionality of a law or its 
provisions, the Supreme Court is also an institutional veto player. 
Additional veto players, termed partisan veto players, may be generated by the political 
process itself, including the process of formally making or informally acknowledging sub-
ordinate distributions of power. As was demonstrated in the 2011 American debt crisis, it 
wasn’t the House of Representatives as an institution but the Republican Party as the major-
ity party within the House that could veto action on debt ceiling legislation. Not only that, a 
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cohesive faction within the Republican Party, the so-called “Tea-Party conservatives”, was 
large enough and sufficiently cohesive to exercise a de facto veto over the Republican 
Party’s position on various debt ceiling relief proposals. In the Senate, in contrast, the De-
mocratic Party held the majority and was a partisan veto player in that body. 
The situation is even more complex in the Senate, however. That body has adopted a 
rule that, to pass, significant legislation requires 60 (of the 100 possible) votes, i.e., a su-
permajority. Thus any block of 41 senators can become a partisan veto player on a given 
legislative proposal. Further, any senator may, on a given occasion, become a partisan 
veto player by positioning him- or herself as the “41st senator” holding out for a particular 
provision or “deal”. In general, any faction that acquires sufficient influence to block ac-
tion by an institutional veto player becomes a partisan veto player. The identity of such 
powerful factions can vary widely from issue to issue and from one Congress to the next 
(as the dramatic shift of legislative power from Democrats to Republicans between 2009 
and 2011 illustrates). 
A revealing example of how this system of checks and balances works is provided by 
the attempt by the Clinton administration to implement an administrative reform adopted 
in Great Britain, the so-called “Next Steps” reform. This reform mimicked corporate 
management by creating individual agencies headed by chief executive officers (CEOs) 
to handle distinct governmental activities on behalf of ministries, each within a regulatory 
framework that included features such as performance measures and targets. Although the 
CEOs were civil servants, their pay was to be based on meeting targets, and removal for 
poor performance was possible in principle. The Clinton administration called its version 
of such agencies, operating under cabinet-level departments, performance based organi-
zations (PBOs). The idea was to have performance agreements that required the admini-
stration to commit to provide specific budgets for the period of years covered by the 
agreements and allow the CEOs considerable latitude in how to use them.  
In Great Britain, the prime minister could authorize the creation of such agencies in a 
message to parliament. In the United States, however, Madison’s checks and balances im-
mediately created obstacles to the creation of PBOs. For example, future Congresses cannot 
be legally bound by the decisions of a sitting Congress. Because power can change hands 
from one Congress to the next, an agreement with the CEO of a PBO was legally in force 
for a maximum of two years. An additional constitutional problem was the inclusion of 
terms preventing the termination of CEO appointments for other than performance-related 
reasons. As Andrew Graham and Alasdair Roberts have shown (2004), America’s formal 
separation of powers allowed Congress to complicate negotiations over the content of an-
nual performance agreements. At the same time, in the U.S. system of governance, Congress 
“may not limit the ability of the President to remove appointees, unless those appointees ex-
ercise quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions that require some independence from the 
administration.” As a consequence of checks and balances, only three PBOs were ultimately 
created, and they were denied significant flexibilities essential to the PBO concept and were 
but a ghostly reflection of the British model.  
In general, management strategies available to governments without a separation of 
powers and with extensive checks and balances (such as the United Kingdom) or to cor-
porate executives in the private sector with unchecked authority over internal organiza-
tion are available only in highly attenuated form to public administrators in the U.S., with 
its separation of powers and extensive checks and balances, not to mention constitution-
ally-prescribed federalism, and, thus, its numerous institutional and partisan veto players. 
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The Goal: Equilibrium 
Madison and the other Founders believed that their exceptional scheme of governance 
would tend toward balance, in effect an equilibrium, among its myriad factions and in-
terests. And so it has, surviving a potentially mortal threat to its unity to become the 
most durable written constitution in the world, adjusting the balance among rival inter-
ests as necessary to meet ordinary and extraordinary circumstances. When the political 
branches of government have been in the hands of different political parties, the result-
ing gridlocks have tended to reflect divisions among the people themselves: ideological 
and interest-based conflicts that remain until a greater clarity and sense of direction 
emerges. 
The extent to which Madison’s argument on behalf of the equilibrating mechanism, 
checks and balances, depends on the overall structure of what Madison terms “the com-
pound republic of America” (339) cannot be overemphasized, however. Both federalism 
– all those state and local governments (so long, Madison insists, as they are of adequate 
size) and pluralism – all those “parts, interests, and classes of citizens” (so long, Madison 
says, as no one faction can dominate the others) – and a federal, state, and local judiciary 
to ensure the rule of law and the just redress of grievances at all levels, are, in the Madi-
sonian system, essential to effective republican governance characterized by liberty and 
justice. It is the entire scheme, not just a few constitutional formalities, which will ensure 
“that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from the inter-
ested combinations [comprising] the majority” (339). 
3. Will Structures Alone Secure Liberty and Justice? 
Yet it is Madison’s scheme which, as we have already noted, produces so many puzzles, 
in the minds of Americans as well as of observers elsewhere, nurturing the impression of 
statelessness. Whenever the American political system appears to be “out of equilibrium”, 
as has arguably been the case in recent years, citizens may become restive and express a 
lack of trust in their governing institutions.7 In the absence of trust and approval, gov-
ernments have fewer resources – of loyalty, skill, forbearance, and funds – to govern. 
Does the Federal government’s chronic failure to address its long-run fiscal imbalances 
demonstrate that Madison’s finely wrought handiwork is failing? Great Britainʼs more 
unified system was able to muster the political will to embrace austerity. Without judging 
the wisdom of its policies, it is evident that a scheme of governance less encumbered with 
veto players produced a decisive outcome where one appeared to be called for. America’s 
government could not do that. 
The Defect of Base Motives 
The problems of governability, accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy that have 
been piling up make an eighteenth century system of structural checks and balances seem 
to many to be obsolete. According to its critics, Madisonian governance cannot be trusted 
to produce either the procedural fairness that legitimizes its outcomes or socially just out-
comes that legitimize its procedures.8 But short of a Jacobin revolution, whose only con-
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temporary avatar appears to be the “primitive libertarian philistines” (Fox’s term) of 
many in the Tea Party movement. It is not clear how radical structural reforms might 
eventuate as either a “whole-of-government” reform or as a revolution.  
Whatever one’s ideology on the virtues or vices of the American republic, the conun-
drum noted by Madison himself cannot be avoided: not enough controls on power allows 
for abuse and arbitrariness, too many checks and balances unduly restricts government’s 
capacity to act to realize policies. How, then, are the problems of the American republi-
can democracy to be addressed? Should Americans remain resolved to confront such 
problems using the scheme devised by Madison and his colleagues for just such purposes, 
as has been done to confront the crises that began in 2008? It is not an academic question: 
the possibility of global depression has, after all, been willfully avoided, with unaccept-
able consequences.  
But the issue is deeper and more difficult. The reality is that public policy at all levels 
of government now requires countless specific decisions that are both arcane and conse-
quential for “the people” in their many categories and groups, for politics, and for public 
administration. While the jugular of major legislation attracts the lion’s share of public at-
tention – the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 – the capillaries – the minimum loss ratio provisions of that Act – inscribed in spe-
cific authorities, appropriations, regulations, and guidelines, and the “rent-seeking” that is 
associated with them, is of vast but much less well understood importance and is closely 
monitored by specific interest groups.  
The following detailed example illustrates the point. In the summer of 2011, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, was forced to shut down, leading to the immediate unem-
ployment, on furlough, of 74,000 employees of the agency and its contractors. The reason 
was a disagreement between the Senate and the House on certain provisions in legisla-
tion, passed in 2007, that would provide long-term authorization for the funding of FAA 
operations. Pending a resolution of this difference, the FAA operated under a series of 
short-term “continuing resolutions” that ensured continuation of existing funding levels. 
Two constitutional checks and balances come into play here. First, all appropriations laws 
must originate in the House. Second, both houses must agree on the text of a law for it to 
be sent to the President for signature. 
In the summer of 2011, however, the Chair of the House Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture Committee slipped into the short-term funding bill a provision that cut funds for the Es-
sential Air Service program, which subsidizes the operations of rural airports that otherwise 
cannot continue to operate. He also added a provision that would reverse a regulatory ruling 
that airline workers can form a union if a majority of ballots favor it, the same rule that gov-
erns most workplaces. This had the effect of restoring the status quo in which employees not 
voting were counted as “no” votes. Other provisions seemed directed at the interests of par-
ticular Democratic Senators. The Senate refused to accept – vetoed – these changes to the 
continuing resolution, forcing a shutdown of the agency. 
A Washington Post reporter subsequently reported as follows. 9 
Congressman John Mica, the Florida Republican blamed for single-handedly shutting down the 
Federal Aviation Administration, sounded like a beaten man when he called me Thursday evening. 
The usually biting chairman of the House transportation committee spoke with remorse about the 
standoff, which put 74,000 people on furlough or out of work, caused delays to airport-safety pro-
jects, and cost hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. 
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“I’ve had a brutal week, getting beat up by everybody,” Mica told me, minutes after Senate Major-
ity Leader Harry Reid announced a deal that would end the shutdown and avoid the cuts to regional 
air service that Mica wanted. I didn’t know it would cause this much consternation,” Mica said. . . . 
“So I don’t know what to do, what to say.” 
 
As the Post reporter, Dana Milbank, put it: “With no goodwill between the two parties, or 
the two chambers, ordinary disagreements mushroom into governing crises, with unpre-
dictable results.” 
The extraordinary, often deeply divisive, and continuously increasing complexity of 
the issues facing American; policy makers helps explain both the growing significance of 
constitutional checks and balances and the proliferation of the kinds of subordinate 
checks and balances enumerated in Figure 2.  
The Madisonian Solution: Add Virtue 
That the current volatile array of groups and categories of Americans, each pursuing its 
own interests, has led to deep fractures in the popular will is, however, neither a valid ar-
gument against Madison’s scheme nor a reason for its amendment in any particular way. 
The solutions to the contemporary ills of American democracy must come from within 
the constitutional system itself.  
For example the extent to which the outcomes of American democracy reflect how 
the nation’s income and wealth are distributed among “the people”, including business 
corporations whose spending on election campaigns now enjoys the free-speech protec-
tion of the First Amendment, remains an urgent question: can a democracy with seriously 
imbalanced income and wealth ensure social justice? To an increasing extent, American 
democracy’s most basic processes, political communication, deliberation, and election, 
are fueled by money, and its concentration distorts these processes. Wealthy individuals 
and corporations can speak much more loudly and often to politicians needing funding 
for their election campaigns than can other individuals.  
This is a political, not a structural, question, however. One suggestion is that the 
growing perception of capitalism’s weaknesses might finally supersede Warner Som-
bart’s question, Why is there no socialism in America? “[T]he current economic crisis”, 
wrote Miguel Requena in 2009, “puts Sombart’s essay on the table for discussion today, a 
hundred years after it was written.” He speculated about the renewed interest in social 
democracy in the United States in the light of the impact Americans were suffering as its 
recession deepened. The reaction of conservative populists to greed on Wall Street and of 
liberals to the consequences of deregulation and the lack of transparency suggest at least 
the possibility of eventual political realignments favoring the left, notwithstanding the 
clamor for reductions in spending, debt, and deficits. Stagnant wages, prolonged jobless-
ness, and rising income inequality and its visible symbols were having their effects, too. 
But Madison wouldn’t flinch at this issue or its prospective solutions. In addressing it 
and the many other problems of our democracy, Madison’s checks and balances have 
served in the past to assist in dramatic reductions in American poverty and income ine-
quality, and they can do so again. But something must be added: virtue among the people. 
Madison’s own argument in The Federalist No. 51 is dispositive: 
“Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be 
pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of 
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which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to 
reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the 
stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of 
their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in 
the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, 
to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful“ 
(340, italics added).  
 
Madison thus comprehended here, and elsewhere in The Federalist, that, even within the 
constitutional scheme in the draft Constitution, liberty might be lost and anarchy reign 
unless the stronger parties submit to a government that protects all parties, the weaker as 
well as themselves.  
Alexander Hamilton concurred. Among his most famous utterances in The Federalist 
No. 70, is that : “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government”. This sentence has led many to suppose that America is an executive-
oriented, managerialist state (Lynn 2008). This supposition, however, overlooks another, 
equally important Hamiltonian precept. To ensure that citizens enjoy “safety” from tyr-
anny of the sort that had led to the Declaration of Independence, administration must, said 
Hamilton, exhibit a “due dependence on the people [and] a due responsibility [in a re-
publican sense].” In other words, the new nation must not tolerate the recreation of Euro-
pean-style central institutions that the Founders saw as threatening liberty and property. 
Appeals to Madison’s evident respect for Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” to supply 
the defect of better motives, moreover, will not defeat the appeal to virtue. In The Wealth 
of Nations, Smith suggested not only the prospect of economic transformation and dra-
matic enhancements of national wealth but, as well, the necessity of regulating the agents 
of such transformation for the preservation of civil rights and for the just distribution of 
its benefits. Smith cautioned, that “civil government, so far as it is instituted for the secu-
rity of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of 
those who have some property against those who have none at all.”10 He acknowledges 
that “regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respects a violation of natural 
liberty. But these exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might en-
danger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all 
governments.”11  
It is ironic, but true, that the legitimacy of American political institutions, sustained 
as they are by the rule of law, depends on an unwritten and unenforceable faith in law and 
lawful institutions. Legal scholar Michael Mullane puts it this way: 
“When you get right down to it, the rule of law only exists because enough of us believe in it and 
insist that everyone, even the nonbelievers, behave as if it exists. The minute enough of us stop be-
lieving, stop insisting that the law protect us all, and that every single one of us is accountable to the 
law – in that moment, the rule of law will be gone. So I cling to my belief in the rule of law. It is 
probably the single greatest achievement of our society. It is our bulwark against both mob rule and 
the overweening power of the modern state. It is the rule of law that governs us, that protects each 
one of us when we stand alone against those who disagree with us, or fear us, or do not like us be-
cause we are different. It is the strongbox that keeps all our other values safe”. 
 
The riddle of America, then, is explained this way: the authority and, of equal impor-
tance, the legitimacy of American governing institutions and their outcomes is the faith 
placed in them by citizens, elected officials, and judges, requiring a sense of responsibil-
ity on the part of all to the principles that protect all. That sense of responsibility on the 
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part of some, as America’s recent political crises demonstrates, can fail, jeopardizing not 
only domestic liberty and justice but threatening the well being of peoples far distant. 
Alas, republican democracy can be like that. 
Notes 
 
1 The “defects” of better motives refers to the private interests of office holders which, because they are 
constituted to be “rival and opposite”, supplement “the people” as a check on tyranny by checking each 
other. See (Allen/Cloonan 2009, 248-249). 
2 This essay draws on, and adapts material from, Bertelli/Lynn 2006, Hill/Lynn 2009, and Lynn 2008, 2009, 
forthcoming). 
3 All quotations re from The Federalist, Modern Library College Editions (softcover), published by Ran-
dom House, n/d. 
4 As Prindle (2004) analyzes it, the argument is between those who privilege Madison’s views concerning 
the tendency of his political scheme to generate virtuous officials and Madison’s mechanistic/Smithian 
view that “ambition must be made to counter ambition”. 
5 For an elaboration of this idea, see Hill/Lynn (2008), pp. 101-115. 
6 Independent estimates by the Congressional Budget Office of the amount of deficit reduction that would 
be accomplished by rival plans to cut spending during the 2011 debt crisis had significant political im-
pacts. This was also the case during the 2009 debates over the Obama Administration’s proposed health 
care reforms. 
7 Immediately following the legislative agreement that ended the debt crisis in August 2011, 82 percent of 
respondents in a popular public opinion poll said that they disapproved of how Congress was doing its 
job, the highest disapproval rate on record (New York Times/CBS News Poll, August 2-3, 2011; at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/05/us/politics/20110805_Poll-docs.html?ref=politics. 
8 The concept of an “equilibrium” to depict Madisonian outcomes may be uninsightful. A netter conceptual 
framework might be provided by repeated game theory and the folk theorem, according to which any out-
come can be a feasible solution if certain conditions are satisfied. 
9 Dana Milbank. 2011. “The FAA and the New Rules of Washington.” Washington Post 5 August. 
10 A contemporary source for this quote is Spiegel (1991, 236). 
11 A contemporary source for this quote is Cassiday (2009, 35). 
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